Demo-Code02 - Add demo files with intentional security vulnerabilities for GitHub A…

[CalinL]

…dvanced Security training

• Created Terraform configuration for Azure resources including a VM, network security group, and public IP.
• Added insecure JavaScript and Python scripts demonstrating common vulnerabilities.
• Introduced an ARM template with insecure configurations, including hardcoded credentials and CORS misconfigurations.
• Implemented a Flask route with SQL injection vulnerabilities and improper error handling.
• Developed a Razor Page with intentional security flaws, including hardcoded API keys and log forging issues.

[github-actions]

Dependency Review

The following issues were found:

• ❌ 3 vulnerable package(s)
• ❌ 7 package(s) with incompatible licenses
• ✅ 0 package(s) with invalid SPDX license definitions
• ✅ 0 package(s) with unknown licenses.

See the Details below.

Snapshot Warnings

⚠️: No snapshots were found for the head SHA 8434868.

Ensure that dependencies are being submitted on PR branches and consider enabling retry-on-snapshot-warnings. See the documentation for more information and troubleshooting advice.

Vulnerabilities

devsecops-demo/Pipfile.lock

Name	Version	Vulnerability	Severity
flask	2.0.2	Flask vulnerable to possible disclosure of permanent session cookie due to missing Vary: Cookie header	high
werkzeug	2.0.2	High resource usage when parsing multipart form data with many fields	high
		Werkzeug debugger vulnerable to remote execution when interacting with attacker controlled domain	high
		Werkzeug DoS: High resource usage when parsing multipart/form-data containing a large part with CR/LF character at the beginning	moderate
		Werkzeug safe_join not safe on Windows	moderate
		Werkzeug possible resource exhaustion when parsing file data in forms	moderate
		Werkzeug safe_join() allows Windows special device names	moderate
		Werkzeug safe_join() allows Windows special device names with compound extensions	moderate
jinja2	3.0.2	Jinja vulnerable to HTML attribute injection when passing user input as keys to xmlattr filter	moderate
		Jinja vulnerable to HTML attribute injection when passing user input as keys to xmlattr filter	moderate
		Jinja has a sandbox breakout through indirect reference to format method	moderate
		Jinja has a sandbox breakout through malicious filenames	moderate
		Jinja2 vulnerable to sandbox breakout through attr filter selecting format method	moderate

Only included vulnerabilities with severity moderate or higher.

License Issues

devsecops-demo/Pipfile.lock

Package	Version	License	Issue Type
flask	2.0.2	BSD-2-Clause AND BSD-3-Clause	Incompatible License
werkzeug	2.0.2	BSD-2-Clause AND BSD-3-Clause	Incompatible License
jinja2	3.0.2	BSD-2-Clause AND BSD-3-Clause	Incompatible License
click	8.0.1	BSD-2-Clause AND BSD-3-Clause	Incompatible License
itsdangerous	2.0.1	BSD-2-Clause	Incompatible License
markupsafe	2.0.1	BSD-2-Clause AND BSD-3-Clause	Incompatible License
python-dotenv	0.19.0	BSD-2-Clause AND BSD-3-Clause	Incompatible License

Allowed Licenses:

MIT, Apache-2.0, GPL-3.0

OpenSSF Scorecard

Package	Version	Score	Details
pip/flask	2.0.2	🟢 5.9	Details Check Score Reason Code-Review ⚠️ 1 Found 4/24 approved changesets -- score normalized to 1 Maintained 🟢 10 30 commit(s) and 11 issue activity found in the last 90 days -- score normalized to 10 Dangerous-Workflow 🟢 10 no dangerous workflow patterns detected Token-Permissions ⚠️ 0 detected GitHub workflow tokens with excessive permissions Binary-Artifacts 🟢 10 no binaries found in the repo CII-Best-Practices ⚠️ 0 no effort to earn an OpenSSF best practices badge detected Pinned-Dependencies 🟢 8 dependency not pinned by hash detected -- score normalized to 8 Fuzzing 🟢 10 project is fuzzed License 🟢 10 license file detected Packaging 🟢 10 packaging workflow detected Signed-Releases 🟢 8 4 out of the last 5 releases have a total of 4 signed artifacts. Branch-Protection 🟢 3 branch protection is not maximal on development and all release branches Security-Policy 🟢 9 security policy file detected Vulnerabilities ⚠️ 0 11 existing vulnerabilities detected SAST ⚠️ 0 SAST tool is not run on all commits -- score normalized to 0
pip/werkzeug	2.0.2	🟢 6	Details Check Score Reason Code-Review ⚠️ 0 Found 1/11 approved changesets -- score normalized to 0 Token-Permissions ⚠️ 0 detected GitHub workflow tokens with excessive permissions Dangerous-Workflow 🟢 10 no dangerous workflow patterns detected Binary-Artifacts 🟢 10 no binaries found in the repo Maintained 🟢 10 30 commit(s) and 15 issue activity found in the last 90 days -- score normalized to 10 Pinned-Dependencies 🟢 8 dependency not pinned by hash detected -- score normalized to 8 CII-Best-Practices ⚠️ 0 no effort to earn an OpenSSF best practices badge detected Fuzzing ⚠️ 0 project is not fuzzed License 🟢 10 license file detected Vulnerabilities 🟢 10 0 existing vulnerabilities detected Signed-Releases 🟢 6 3 out of the last 5 releases have a total of 3 signed artifacts. Packaging 🟢 10 packaging workflow detected Branch-Protection 🟢 3 branch protection is not maximal on development and all release branches Security-Policy 🟢 9 security policy file detected SAST ⚠️ 0 SAST tool is not run on all commits -- score normalized to 0
pip/jinja2	3.0.2	🟢 5.3	Details Check Score Reason Maintained ⚠️ 1 0 commit(s) and 2 issue activity found in the last 90 days -- score normalized to 1 Code-Review ⚠️ 0 Found 1/18 approved changesets -- score normalized to 0 Dangerous-Workflow 🟢 10 no dangerous workflow patterns detected Binary-Artifacts 🟢 10 no binaries found in the repo CII-Best-Practices ⚠️ 0 no effort to earn an OpenSSF best practices badge detected Token-Permissions ⚠️ 0 detected GitHub workflow tokens with excessive permissions Pinned-Dependencies 🟢 8 dependency not pinned by hash detected -- score normalized to 8 Fuzzing 🟢 10 project is fuzzed License 🟢 10 license file detected Packaging 🟢 10 packaging workflow detected Signed-Releases 🟢 10 4 out of the last 4 releases have a total of 4 signed artifacts. Security-Policy 🟢 9 security policy file detected Branch-Protection 🟢 3 branch protection is not maximal on development and all release branches Vulnerabilities ⚠️ 0 14 existing vulnerabilities detected SAST ⚠️ 0 SAST tool is not run on all commits -- score normalized to 0
pip/click	8.0.1	🟢 6.3	Details Check Score Reason Maintained 🟢 10 30 commit(s) and 21 issue activity found in the last 90 days -- score normalized to 10 Code-Review 🟢 5 Found 7/13 approved changesets -- score normalized to 5 Dangerous-Workflow 🟢 10 no dangerous workflow patterns detected Binary-Artifacts 🟢 10 no binaries found in the repo CII-Best-Practices ⚠️ 0 no effort to earn an OpenSSF best practices badge detected Token-Permissions ⚠️ 0 detected GitHub workflow tokens with excessive permissions Pinned-Dependencies 🟢 8 dependency not pinned by hash detected -- score normalized to 8 Fuzzing 🟢 10 project is fuzzed License 🟢 10 license file detected Packaging 🟢 10 packaging workflow detected Signed-Releases 🟢 4 2 out of the last 5 releases have a total of 2 signed artifacts. Vulnerabilities 🟢 4 6 existing vulnerabilities detected Security-Policy 🟢 9 security policy file detected Branch-Protection 🟢 3 branch protection is not maximal on development and all release branches SAST ⚠️ 0 SAST tool is not run on all commits -- score normalized to 0
pip/itsdangerous	2.0.1	🟢 4.9	Details Check Score Reason Code-Review ⚠️ 0 Found 1/23 approved changesets -- score normalized to 0 Dangerous-Workflow 🟢 10 no dangerous workflow patterns detected Maintained ⚠️ 0 0 commit(s) and 0 issue activity found in the last 90 days -- score normalized to 0 Binary-Artifacts 🟢 10 no binaries found in the repo CII-Best-Practices ⚠️ 0 no effort to earn an OpenSSF best practices badge detected Token-Permissions ⚠️ 0 detected GitHub workflow tokens with excessive permissions Pinned-Dependencies 🟢 8 dependency not pinned by hash detected -- score normalized to 8 Fuzzing 🟢 10 project is fuzzed License 🟢 10 license file detected Packaging ⚠️ -1 packaging workflow not detected Signed-Releases 🟢 10 1 out of the last 1 releases have a total of 1 signed artifacts. Security-Policy 🟢 9 security policy file detected Branch-Protection 🟢 3 branch protection is not maximal on development and all release branches Vulnerabilities ⚠️ 0 14 existing vulnerabilities detected SAST ⚠️ 0 SAST tool is not run on all commits -- score normalized to 0
pip/markupsafe	2.0.1	🟢 5.3	Details Check Score Reason Maintained ⚠️ 0 0 commit(s) and 1 issue activity found in the last 90 days -- score normalized to 0 Dangerous-Workflow 🟢 10 no dangerous workflow patterns detected Binary-Artifacts 🟢 10 no binaries found in the repo Code-Review ⚠️ 1 Found 3/22 approved changesets -- score normalized to 1 Pinned-Dependencies 🟢 9 dependency not pinned by hash detected -- score normalized to 9 Token-Permissions ⚠️ 0 detected GitHub workflow tokens with excessive permissions CII-Best-Practices ⚠️ 0 no effort to earn an OpenSSF best practices badge detected Fuzzing 🟢 10 project is fuzzed License 🟢 10 license file detected Packaging 🟢 10 packaging workflow detected Vulnerabilities ⚠️ 1 9 existing vulnerabilities detected Security-Policy 🟢 9 security policy file detected Branch-Protection 🟢 3 branch protection is not maximal on development and all release branches Signed-Releases 🟢 8 4 out of the last 5 releases have a total of 4 signed artifacts. SAST ⚠️ 0 SAST tool is not run on all commits -- score normalized to 0
pip/python-dotenv	0.19.0	🟢 5.3	Details Check Score Reason Code-Review 🟢 4 Found 12/28 approved changesets -- score normalized to 4 Maintained 🟢 10 13 commit(s) and 1 issue activity found in the last 90 days -- score normalized to 10 Binary-Artifacts 🟢 10 no binaries found in the repo Security-Policy 🟢 10 security policy file detected Token-Permissions ⚠️ 0 detected GitHub workflow tokens with excessive permissions Dangerous-Workflow 🟢 10 no dangerous workflow patterns detected CII-Best-Practices ⚠️ 0 no effort to earn an OpenSSF best practices badge detected Pinned-Dependencies ⚠️ 0 dependency not pinned by hash detected -- score normalized to 0 Packaging ⚠️ -1 packaging workflow not detected License 🟢 10 license file detected Fuzzing ⚠️ 0 project is not fuzzed Vulnerabilities 🟢 9 1 existing vulnerabilities detected Signed-Releases ⚠️ -1 no releases found Branch-Protection ⚠️ 0 branch protection not enabled on development/release branches SAST ⚠️ 0 SAST tool is not run on all commits -- score normalized to 0

Scanned Files

• devsecops-demo/Pipfile.lock

In general, the fix is to stop catching BaseException via a bare except: and instead catch only the specific exception types that are expected, or at least Exception, so that KeyboardInterrupt and SystemExit can still propagate. When ignoring errors, it is still better to be explicit about which kinds of problems you are discarding.

For the block at lines 7–10, the only plausible runtime error is an IndexError from accessing xs[7] or xs[8]. If we want to preserve the behavior “ignore out-of-range index errors,” we can change except: to except IndexError:. That will no longer swallow KeyboardInterrupt or SystemExit, but will still ignore the indexing error exactly as before. No additional imports or helper functions are needed; IndexError is a built-in exception. The other bare except: on line 16 is not the one CodeQL highlighted in the prompt, and per instructions we only change the snippet directly associated with the reported issue, so we leave it unchanged.

Concretely, in devsecops-demo/insecure-01.py, replace line 10:

10: except: pass

with:

10: except IndexError: pass

leaving the rest of the file intact.

In general, to fix an empty except block you should either (1) remove the try/except entirely if you don’t need it, (2) catch only the specific exception types you expect, and/or (3) add real handling such as logging, cleanup, or re‑raising. You should avoid bare except: and avoid silently ignoring exceptions.

For this snippet, the minimal, behavior‑preserving fix is:

• Replace the bare except: with an except IndexError as e: (the expected error from xs[8]).
• Replace the pass with a small, explicit handling action that still keeps the program running but no longer silently hides the issue, e.g. printing an explanatory message that includes the exception text.

This keeps the program structure and visible side effects close to the original intent (demonstration code that continues after an out‑of‑range access) while satisfying the static analysis rule and improving debuggability. Only devsecops-demo/insecure-01.py needs edits, and no new imports or helper functions are required.

In general, this problem is fixed by never using a bare except: (which is equivalent to except BaseException:). Instead, catch specific exception types such as Exception or, even better, the concrete error you expect (here TypeError), and let KeyboardInterrupt/SystemExit propagate naturally.

In this particular snippet, the loop over ys is intentionally causing TypeError when adding 3 to None. The current behavior is: on any exception, skip to the next y. To preserve functionality while avoiding catching KeyboardInterrupt and SystemExit, we should change except: on line 16 to catch TypeError specifically (or at least Exception). That way, only the expected error from y + 3 is handled, and the loop still continues on those errors. No additional imports or helper methods are needed. The change is confined to devsecops-demo/insecure-01.py, lines 13–16, where we replace except: continue with except TypeError: continue.

To fix an unused import, the general approach is to remove the import statement for any module that is never referenced in the file. This eliminates unnecessary dependencies and slightly reduces load time and mental overhead.

In this file (devsecops-demo/insecure-01.py), the best fix is to delete the import telnetlib line at line 19, leaving the import ftplib line intact because we have not been asked to address it and it may be used or intentionally present for demonstration purposes. No additional methods, imports, or definitions are needed; we are only removing a redundant import.

To fix the problem, remove the unused ftplib import so that all imports in the file correspond to code that is actually used. This reduces unnecessary dependencies and improves readability without affecting functionality, since ftplib is never referenced.

Concretely, in devsecops-demo/insecure-01.py, delete the line import ftplib at line 20, leaving the telnetlib and hashlib imports intact. No additional methods, imports, or definitions are required, as the rest of the code already runs without ftplib.

To fix the problem, remove the unused symbol make_response from the import statement so that only the actually used imports remain. This avoids an unnecessary dependency, keeps the imports clean, and does not change any functionality since make_response is not used.

Concretely, in devsecops-demo/routes-01.py, on line 2, change from flask import request, render_template, make_response to import only request and render_template. No other code changes are required, and no new methods, imports, or definitions are needed.

To fix the problem, we should either (a) remove the unused variable assignment entirely, or (b) rename it to something like _read or _ if it is intentionally unused for documentation purposes. Since the right-hand side has no side effects and the parameter is not used at all, the simplest change that does not alter functionality is to delete the assignment line.

Specifically, in devsecops-demo/routes-01.py, within the index view function, remove line 12: read = bool(request.args.get('read')). No other code depends on read, so no additional changes are required. No imports, methods, or definitions need to be added.

In general, to prevent log entries from being forged with user-controlled data, any user input that is included in log messages should be normalized before logging. For plain-text logs, the primary step is to remove or neutralize newline and other control characters so that an attacker cannot break out of the intended log line or inject additional lines. For logs that might be displayed as HTML, HTML-encoding before logging can also be used, but here we only know that we are writing to an ILogger, which commonly backs plain-text or structured logs.

The best minimal fix here is to sanitize the drive value (or the derived str) before using it in the log message. A straightforward approach is to remove carriage return and newline characters from drive before constructing str, or alternatively to sanitize str before logging it. To preserve existing functionality (constructing the same command string for later use), we should only change what is logged, not the command variable itself. That suggests adding a sanitized copy for log purposes. Concretely, in OnGet, we can introduce a sanitizedStr variable that replaces \r and \n with empty strings (or spaces) and then log sanitizedStr. This requires only changes within Privacy.cshtml.cs around lines 20–22 and does not require new imports.

In general, to fix insecure SQL connections, the connection string passed to SqlConnection (or constructed via SqlConnectionStringBuilder) must explicitly set Encrypt=True so that the client refuses to connect without TLS. Optionally, TrustServerCertificate=False can be added to ensure proper certificate validation, but the CodeQL rule specifically requires Encrypt=True.

For this file, the minimal and safest fix without changing any behavior is to update the DB_CONNECTION constant on line 21 to include Encrypt=True; at the end of the connection string. No other code changes are required because the constant is only used to construct the SqlConnection. We do not need new methods, imports, or refactoring to SqlConnectionStringBuilder; simply appending Encrypt=True; to the existing string is sufficient and preserves the rest of the functionality and demo behavior.

Concretely:

• Edit src/webapp01/Pages/DevSecOps-7492.cshtml.cs.
• On line 21, change
  private const string DB_CONNECTION = "Server=demo-server;Database=SecurityDemo;User Id=demouser;Password=DemoPass2026!;";
  to
  private const string DB_CONNECTION = "Server=demo-server;Database=SecurityDemo;User Id=demouser;Password=DemoPass2026!;Encrypt=True;";
• No other lines or files need modification.

In general, to prevent log forging when logging user input, you should sanitize or encode that input before logging. For plain-text logs, the most important step is to remove or neutralize line breaks and other control characters so a single logical log entry cannot be split into multiple physical lines. Optionally, you can also normalize other non-printable characters.

For this specific file, the best minimal fix without changing behavior is to sanitize the user-controlled strings before interpolating them into log messages. We can introduce a small helper method (e.g., SanitizeForLog) inside DevSecOps7492Model that removes \r and \n from strings (and safely handles null), then use it whenever we log user input. We only have to modify code in the shown snippet, so we’ll define this helper as a private method in the same class and replace direct uses of userName, userAgent, and testInput in log messages with their sanitized counterparts. No new imports are needed because we can implement sanitization with string.Replace, which is already available.

Concretely:

• Add a private method in DevSecOps7492Model (near other members) that takes a string? and returns a sanitized string, removing \r and \n.
• In OnGet, create sanitized local variables (e.g., sanitizedUserName, sanitizedUserAgent, sanitizedTestInput) using this helper.
• Use those sanitized variables in all log lines that currently interpolate user-controlled data: lines 45, 46, 63, and 68.
• Keep exception and other non-user-controlled data unchanged.

This preserves existing functionality while preventing an attacker from injecting line breaks into log entries.

In general, to fix log forging vulnerabilities, any user-controlled input included in log messages must be sanitized or encoded before logging. For plain-text logs, this usually means removing or normalizing newline and other control characters so that user input cannot break the log format or introduce fake entries. It is also good practice to label user input clearly so it cannot be confused with system-generated text.

For this specific case, the best minimal fix is to sanitize testInput right before it is used in logging on line 63 (and line 68, which also logs the raw input), by removing line breaks from the string. We can do this by creating a local sanitized variable, e.g. sanitizedTestInput, that replaces \r and \n with empty strings. Then we use that sanitized value in all log messages instead of testInput. This avoids changing external behavior (the logs will still contain the input, but without line breaks), and does not require altering the rest of the method logic.

Concretely, in src/webapp01/Pages/DevSecOps-7492.cshtml.cs, inside the if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(testInput)) block:

• Insert a new line declaring var sanitizedTestInput = testInput.Replace("\r", string.Empty).Replace("\n", string.Empty); after we know testInput is not null or empty (e.g., right after line 56/57).
• Change the log on line 63 to interpolate sanitizedTestInput instead of testInput.
• Change the log on line 68 to use sanitizedTestInput in the message instead of testInput.

No new imports or methods are required, since string.Replace is available by default.

In general, this problem is fixed either by (a) changing the regex to one that does not have nested or overlapping quantifiers (removing catastrophic backtracking potential), or (b) enforcing an execution timeout on regex evaluation so that even if worst‑case behavior occurs, it cannot be used for denial of service. For .NET, the recommended approach is to use the Regex constructor that accepts a TimeSpan match timeout, or to set a domain-wide default. Here, the simplest fix with minimal behavior change is to keep the pattern but construct the Regex with a sensible timeout.

Concretely, in src/webapp01/Pages/DevSecOps-7492.cshtml.cs, update the InsecureRegex field on line 24 so that it uses the Regex constructor overload with a TimeSpan timeout (for example, 1 second). This preserves existing matching behavior but ensures that extremely slow matches are aborted. The change is local to that field: private static readonly Regex InsecureRegex = new Regex(@"^(([a-z])+.)+[A-Z]([a-z])+$", RegexOptions.None); should be replaced with a call like new Regex(..., RegexOptions.None, TimeSpan.FromSeconds(1));. No changes are required at the call site on line 61, since IsMatch is still invoked on the same static field. System.Text.RegularExpressions is already imported, so no new imports are needed.

In general, the fix is to avoid catching System.Exception generically and instead catch the specific exceptions that the protected code is expected to throw, adding (if needed) a final generic catch that is clearly separated and rethrows or minimally handles truly unexpected exceptions. This keeps error handling intentional and makes debugging easier.

For this snippet, the risky operation is the creation/use of SqlConnection. The most relevant specific exception type from Microsoft.Data.SqlClient is SqlException. We can first catch SqlException to handle database-related problems, then optionally have a final catch that captures all other exceptions, logs them at a higher severity, and rethrows so that truly unexpected failures are not silently swallowed. To avoid changing existing functionality too much, we will preserve the current log message for SQL-related failures, and only add a more severe log and rethrow for non-SQL unexpected exceptions.

Concretely, in src/webapp01/Pages/DevSecOps-7492.cshtml.cs, within OnGet, replace the generic catch (Exception ex) around the SQL connection (lines 80–83) with:

• catch (SqlException ex) that logs the same message as today.
• A subsequent catch (Exception ex) that logs an “unexpected error” message and then throw;. We already have using Microsoft.Data.SqlClient; at the top, so no new imports are needed.

This change narrows the main handling to SQL-related issues while still making sure other serious exceptions are not silently consumed.

---

In general, to fix redundant ToString() calls in interpolated strings or formatting calls, you should pass the object directly and let the language/runtime invoke ToString() implicitly. This keeps the code cleaner and avoids unnecessary method calls without changing behavior.

For this specific case in src/webapp01/Pages/DevSecOps-7492.cshtml.cs, line 68 currently logs the exception via $"... {ex.ToString()}". The best fix is to remove the explicit .ToString() and interpolate ex directly: $"... {ex}". C# string interpolation will automatically call ex.ToString() under the hood, resulting in identical log output. No additional imports, methods, or other changes are required; only that single expression inside the interpolated string needs to be updated.

Concretely:

• In the catch (Exception ex) block inside OnGet, replace ex.ToString() with just ex in the _logger.LogError call on line 68.
• No other lines, files, or definitions need modifications.

In general, to fix a “generic catch clause” issue, replace catch (Exception) (or a bare catch) with one or more specific exception types that you actually intend to handle, and let other exceptions propagate. Each catch block should correspond to a clear, documented failure mode that can be reasonably recovered from or logged with accurate context.

For the regex block (lines 58–69), the only realistic, expected exception scenario is when the regex engine throws an ArgumentException, typically due to an invalid pattern. Since the pattern is static and already compiled into InsecureRegex, the only real reason for an ArgumentException here would be if the pattern definition were changed to something invalid at development time; nonetheless, if the intent is to keep the demo resilient, we can still catch ArgumentException but allow other serious exceptions to propagate. Thus we should change catch (Exception ex) at line 65 to catch (ArgumentException ex), leaving the logging behavior intact.

For the SQL connection block (lines 73–82), the likely exceptions are SqlException (if connection creation or opening fails at the SQL client/server level) and InvalidOperationException (for invalid state transitions). Because the demo is focused on database connectivity, handling SqlException explicitly is the most appropriate minimal change, while still avoiding a generic catch. The block does not currently call Open(), but narrowing the catch improves correctness with no functional change. Therefore we should change catch (Exception ex) at line 80 to catch (SqlException ex). No additional imports are required since Microsoft.Data.SqlClient is already imported at line 10, and ArgumentException is part of System, which is always available.

Concretely:

• In src/webapp01/Pages/DevSecOps-7492.cshtml.cs, at the regex try/catch, replace catch (Exception ex) with catch (ArgumentException ex).
• In the database connection try/catch, replace catch (Exception ex) with catch (SqlException ex).

No other code changes, imports, or new methods are needed.

In general, to fix this pattern you should replace dictionary.ContainsKey(key) ? dictionary[key] : default with a single call to dictionary.TryGetValue(key, out value) (or the equivalent TryGetValue method on the collection type) and then operate on the retrieved value. This combines the existence check and retrieval into one operation.

For this specific file, on line 55 we currently compute testInput as:

string testInput = Request.Query.ContainsKey("test") ? Request.Query["test"].ToString() ?? "" : "";

Request.Query is an IQueryCollection, which supports TryGetValue(string key, out StringValues value). The best fix that preserves existing behavior is:

1. Call Request.Query.TryGetValue("test", out var testValues).
2. If it returns true, convert testValues to string and coalesce null to "".
3. If it returns false, set testInput to "".

This keeps the semantics identical: testInput is "" when the key is absent or when the value converts to null. No imports are required because TryGetValue is already available on IQueryCollection, and we are not introducing any new types beyond var for the out variable.

Concretely, in src/webapp01/Pages/DevSecOps-7492.cshtml.cs, replace the single line 55 with a small block that uses TryGetValue as described below.

• In general, replace if (dict.ContainsKey(key)) dict[key] patterns with a single dict.TryGetValue(key, out value) call, which both checks existence and retrieves the value in one dictionary operation.

• In this file, on line 42 in OnGet, we should replace the ContainsKey + indexer usage with an IQueryCollection.TryGetValue call. We’ll store the value in a local string variable and preserve the existing fallback to "anonymous" when the query parameter is missing or empty.

• Concretely, in OnGet, replace:

  string userName = Request.Query.ContainsKey("user") ? Request.Query["user"].ToString() ?? "anonymous" : "anonymous";

  with something like:

  if (!Request.Query.TryGetValue("user", out var userValues) ||
              StringValues.IsNullOrEmpty(userValues) ||
              string.IsNullOrEmpty(userValues.ToString()))
  {
      userName = "anonymous";
  }
  else
  {
      userName = userValues.ToString();
  }

  or an equivalent condensed expression. To use StringValues.IsNullOrEmpty, we must add using Microsoft.Extensions.Primitives; at the top. This keeps behavior consistent: if the parameter is missing or its value is null/empty, we still get "anonymous".

• No new methods are needed, only:

  • One new using directive.
  • Replacement of the single line that currently uses ContainsKey with a TryGetValue-based expression.

[github-advanced-security]

templateanalyzer found more than 20 potential problems in the proposed changes. Check the Files changed tab for more details.

[github-advanced-security]

checkov found more than 20 potential problems in the proposed changes. Check the Files changed tab for more details.