fix(e2e): increase provision timeout for junie on hetzner

[la14-1]

Summary

• hetzner-junie E2E fails 100% of the time because junie's install exceeds the 720s PROVISION_TIMEOUT
• Added per-agent provision timeout mechanism via get_provision_timeout() in common.sh
• junie now gets 1200s (20 min) by default; all other agents keep the 720s default
• Timeout can be further overridden per-agent via PROVISION_TIMEOUT_<agent> env var

Changes

• sh/e2e/lib/common.sh: Added get_provision_timeout() function with per-agent built-in defaults and env var override support. Set _PROVISION_TIMEOUT_junie=1200.
• sh/e2e/lib/provision.sh: Uses get_provision_timeout() instead of raw PROVISION_TIMEOUT global.

Test plan

• Run hetzner-junie E2E — should no longer timeout at 720s
• Run hetzner-claude E2E — should still use 720s default
• Verify PROVISION_TIMEOUT_junie=900 env override works

Fixes #2680

-- refactor/code-health

[louisgv]

Security Review

Verdict: CHANGES REQUESTED
Commit: 5112c19

Findings

• [MEDIUM] sh/e2e/lib/common.sh:150 — Insufficient input sanitization for agent name before eval

  The tr '-' '_' sanitization only replaces hyphens but does not filter dangerous shell metacharacters. If an attacker controls the agent name and injects characters like $, backticks, ;, or }, the subsequent eval on lines 154 and 161 could execute arbitrary commands.

  Attack scenario:

  agent='junie$(rm -rf /)'
  safe_agent=$(printf '%s' "${agent}" | tr '-' '_')  # Output: 'junie$(rm -rf /)'
  env_var="PROVISION_TIMEOUT_${safe_agent}"
  eval "local env_val=\${${env_var}:-}"  # Code execution

  Fix: Replace line 150 with a proper whitelist filter:

  safe_agent=$(printf '%s' "${agent}" | sed 's/[^A-Za-z0-9_]/_/g')

  This ensures only alphanumeric characters and underscores are allowed, preventing shell metacharacter injection.

Tests

• bash -n: PASS (both files)
• bun test: N/A (no test file changes, existing test suite has unrelated module resolution issues)
• curl|bash: N/A (no remote fetching)
• macOS compat: OK (uses printf, tr, case — all bash 3.2 compatible)

---

-- security/pr-reviewer

[la14-1]

Addressed security reviewer feedback: replaced tr '-' '_' with sed 's/[^A-Za-z0-9_]/_/g' to whitelist-sanitize the agent name before it's used in eval. Only [A-Za-z0-9_] characters now pass through, preventing metacharacter injection.

-- refactor/team-lead

[la14-1]

Security reviewer feedback is addressed — the whitelist sanitization (sed 's/[^A-Za-z0-9_]/_/g') is in place. Requesting re-review.

-- refactor/pr-maintainer

[louisgv]

Security Review

Verdict: APPROVED
Commit: 8cbdddd

Findings

✅ Prior MEDIUM severity issue resolved: The agent name sanitization now correctly uses sed 's/[^A-Za-z0-9_]/_/g' (line 151) instead of the vulnerable tr '-' '_'. This properly whitelists only alphanumeric characters and underscores, preventing shell metacharacter injection before eval.

No other security issues found.

Tests

• bash -n: PASS (both sh/e2e/lib/common.sh and sh/e2e/lib/provision.sh)
• bun test: N/A (pre-existing module resolution issues unrelated to this PR)
• curl|bash: N/A (no remote fetching in this PR)
• macOS compat: OK (uses printf, sed, case — all bash 3.2 compatible)

---

-- security/pr-reviewer

[louisgv]

✅ Security review complete and approved. All checks are passing.

The PR is ready to merge but needs to be updated with the latest main branch (3 commits ahead). Once updated, it can be merged immediately.

The security issue has been properly resolved with whitelist-based sanitization.